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AL-SHABAZZ V. STATE: EXCLUDING
NONCOLLATERAL CLAIMS FROM THE SCOPE
OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
I. INTRODUCTION
"The wild ass of the law which the courts cannot control"' has been
bridled. Sleep will come easier now that the feral beast of burden, writ ofcoram
nobis, has been roped and tied. At common law, coram nobis was a common
law writ used to collaterally challenge a conviction or sentence. Despite the
writ's long history, however, its elusive nature consistently defied courts to
precisely characterize either its scope or procedure.2 In the modem era, South
Carolina and thirty-two other states3 have developed Post-Conviction Relief
(PCR) in the tradition of coram nobis.4 The South Carolina Supreme Court's
recent decision inAl-Shabazz v. State5 allowed the court to clarify those issues
reviewable through the PCR6 mechanism, thus settling age-old questions about
the scope of coram nobis as well.
1. LARRY W. YACKLE, POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES § 8, at 31 (1981).
2. Id. at 37, 42.
3. Id. at 66-68. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-410 (1999); IDAHO CODE §§ 19-4901
to -4911 (1949); IOWA CODEANN. § 663A (West 1998); KY. R. CRIM. P. 11.42; MD. CODEANN.,
Crimes and Punishments § 645A (1996 & Supp. 1999); MASS. R. CRiM. P. 30; MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 590.01-.06 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-35-145 (1972); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 46-21-101 to -203 (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3001 to -3101 (1995); N.J. CT. R.
ANN. 3:22; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1411 to -1431 (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1080-
1088 (West 1986 & Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-9.1-1 to -9 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-27-10 to -100 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999); TENN. CODEANN. §§ 40-30-201
to -222 (1997); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-14-101 to -107 (Michie 1999).
4. The writ of coram nobis initiated a post-conviction challenge to the original judgment,
resting upon errors of fact. YACKLE, supra note 1, at 32. Its objective was a new trial. Id. at 31.
Early common law entertained neither motions for a new trial nor appellate review. Id. at 37.
Thus, a line of coram nobis writs developed to accommodate these procedural needs. Id.
Although a forerunner to the modem motion for a new trial, coram nobis has not always been
viewed as a continuation of the original case. Id. at 31, 37. Like habeas corpus, coram nobis
typically was an independent civil action challenging a criminal conviction. Id. at 33. However,
whereas habeas corpus directly attacks the conviction and sentence in the court that presently
hasjurisdiction over the inmate, coram nobis collaterally challenged facts and effects outside the
case record before the court of original judgment. Id. Classic examples include clerical errors
by assistants, mistakes in the process of notice and pleading, and any events outside the
courtroom that generally call into question the credibility of the judgment. Id. at 32.
5. 527 S.E.2d 742 (2000).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -100 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999).
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Although coram nobis has little practical relation with South Carolina's
PCR statute or the court's determination in Al-Shabazz,7 its history is
illustrative of how PCR remedies have created timeless confusion and debate.
What rights-both procedural and substantive-remain for citizens convicted
by the approved criminal system? How do we balance efficient and safe
governance of our penal system with a fair and accessible remedy for the
wrongly imprisoned and the imprisoned wronged? For what injustices should
the convicted have a right to redress? From the King's Bench' to the United
States Supreme Court, these questions have weighed heavily on judicial minds
who have sought to develop ajust system ofpost-conviction relief.9 Ultimately,
such questions have made application of post-conviction remedies, like coram
nobis, unpredictable.
Not surprisingly, a conflicted body of case law surrounds South Carolina's
PCR Act. Despite the statute's existence, South Carolina has been unable to
apply its mandates consistently." Nowhere has this difficulty been more
apparent than in the areas of good-time credits" and conditions of
imprisonment. In Al-Shabazz the court finally drew bright-lines that officially
7. South Carolina's PCR Act is like a coram nobis remedy because the PCR proceeding
is "heard in, and before any judge of, a court of competent jurisdiction in the county in which
the [original] conviction took place." S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp1999); See YACKLE, supra note 1, at 43. However, by passing the PCR Act, the South
Carolina General Assembly intended simply to provide an alternative post-conviction remedy
to the federal writ of habeas corpus. 527 S.E.2d at 747-748. State PCR statutes have developed
almost entirely in response to encroachment of the federal courts upon state post-conviction
remedies. YACKLE, supra note 1, at 41. The United States Supreme Court warned that in the
"absence ofmeaningful state procedures" for inmates' federal claims, federal courts would hear
applications for the federal writ of habeas corpus. Id; see also Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336,
337 (1965) (encouraging states to provide a clear alternative method of post-conviction relief).
Thus, while a comparison with coram nobis provides some meaningful insight for academic
purposes, any similarities between South Carolina's present statutory PCR scheme and coram
nobis are of little practical consequence.
8. YACKLE, supra note 1, at 37-38.
9. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560, 572 (1974).
10. For example, despite the court's prohibition of credit-related and prison condition
claims, see, e.g., Tutt v. State, 277 S.C. 525, 290 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1982), the South Carolina
Supreme Court has permitted inmates to raise claims regarding sentence-related credits in certain
instances; see also Busby v. Moore, 330 S.C. 201, 202, 498 S.E.2d 883, 884 (1998) (granting
PCR application to determine proper calculation of good-time credits); Harris v. State, 309 S.C.
466,424 S.E.2d 509(1992) (granting PCR application to determine effect of Omnibus Crime bill
on earned work credits); Elmore v. State, 305 S.C. 456, 457, 409 S.E.2d 397, 398 (1991)
(granting PCR application to determine effect of Omnibus Crime bill on earned work credits).
Additionally, the state supreme court has since permitted inmates to raise claims as to prison
conditions in PCR proceedings. See Simmons v. State, 316 S.C. 28, 30, 446 S.E.2d 436, 437
(1994) (finding that "conditions of imprisonment have been considered on a discretionary basis
in PCR proceedings").
11. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-13-210 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) (allowing an inmate to
amass good-time credits to be applied to a reduction in her sentence).
Vol. 51: 839
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severed these claims from the protection ofthe state's PCRmechanism in order
"to bring finality to this confused area of the law."'
2
In discussing the relative merits of the court's determinationinAl-Shabazz,
this Note will continue to appreciate the enduring and conflicting interests that
have historically troubled the development of PCR. While acknowledging that
theAl-Shabazz court genuinely confronted these contending interests, this Note
will suggest that the court's interpretation of South Carolina's PCR Act was
detrimental to inmates' protected liberty interests and fundamentally wrong.
Part II of this Note will present the facts and issues before the court in Al-
Shabazz. Part II will also summarize the court's holdings, its reasoning, and the
likely effects of its decision. Part HI will then analyze the court's interpretation
of the PCR Act. Finally, Part III will compare the respective advantages of
PCR and Administrative Procedure Act (APA) proceedings and will conclude
that South Carolina's PCR Act should be interpreted to include both credits-
related and prison condition claims.
II BACKGROUND
A. Procedure Under South Carolina's PCR Statute
Before Al-Shabazz, inmates used South Carolina's version of the Uniform
Post-Conviction Procedure Act 3 to raise issues regarding loss of good-time
credits and prison conditions.14 The Act continues to allow inmates to
collaterally challenge" the validity of their conviction or incarceration,
subsequent to the final disposition of all appeals.'" Consequently, the Act
requires that the challenge allege errors or evidence other than the insufficiency
of the original evidence in record.' An inmate initiates a civil proceeding by
12. 527 S.E.2d at 758 (Finney, J., concurring).
13. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-27-10 to -100 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999);
UNIFORMPOST-CONVICTIONPROCEDtJREACr(amended 1980), 1 lAU.L.A. 249(1995); seesupra
note 10.
14. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999); Al-
Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 748.
15. A "collateral attack" is an incidental proceeding to challenge the force and effect of a
prior judicial decision. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 179 (6th ed. 1991).
16. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999); S.C.R.
Civ. P. 71.1(b).
17. S.C.CODEANN. § 17-27-20(a)(6) (Law. Co-op. 1976 &WestSupp. 1999). Specifically
the Act permits inmates to claim the following:
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution or laws of this State;
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
(3) That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law;
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously
presented and heard, that requires vacation of the conviction or
sentence in the interest ofjustice;
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or
2000
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filing a PCR application with the court in the county of the original
conviction."8 For indigent applicants, the statute requires the court to appoint
counsel and cover litigation expenses if a hearing is granted.19 The state must
then respond within thirty days, either by answer or by motion for summary
dismissal.2 The judge may grant a motion for summary judgment by either
party.2' If a hearing is granted, the court enters or denies relief based upon its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.Y Al-Shabazz does not modify this
process.' Rather, the court's determination makes the process inappropriate for
the disposition of certain noncollateral claims.24
B. Al-Shabazz v. State
Malik Abdul Al-Shabazz amassed certain good-time credits applicable
toward a reduction in his sentence while serving an 83 year prison sentence."
An Adjustment Committee (Committee) of the South Carolina Department of
Corrections (Department), in addition to sentencing A1-Shabazz to solitary
confinement, voided a portion of Al-Shabazz's acquired credits.26 The
Committee based the decision on alleged violations of institutional rules.27
Subsequently, A1-Shabazz challenged the Committee's determination in
his PCR application.28 A1-Shabazz alleged certain defects in the Committee's
adjudication, which he claimed both deviated from the Department's own
policies and violated his constitutional rights of due process and equal
protection.29 The alleged defects included the Committee's refusal to provide
conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise
unlawfully held in custody or other restraint; or
(6) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to
collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error .... Provided,
however, that this section shall not be construed to permit collateral
attack on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support
a conviction.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999).
18. Id. § 17-27-40.
19. Id. § 17-27-60. See generally Vance L. Cowden, Indigent Defense Services For Post-
Conviction Reliefln South Carolina: CurrentProblemsAndPotentialRemedies, 42 S.C.L. REV.
417, 418 (1991) (analyzing the system for assigning counsel in PCR cases and suggesting
alternatives for improvement).
20. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999).
21. Id.
22. Id. § 17-27-80.
23. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 746.
24. Id. at 749-50.
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competent inmate counsel30 orto allow Al-Shabazz to call his own witnesses.3'
The state asked the PCRjudge to dismiss the application32 in accordance with
Tutt v. State.33 The judge dismissed the case.34 On appeal, the South Carolina
Supreme Court vacated the summary dismissal and remanded the case for a
proceeding not inconsistent with the court's holding.35  Al-Shabazz
subsequently filed for a rehearing, which the court granted.36 The court also
permitted the Department, which had not been a party to the original action, to
intervene.37 The court delivered a second opinion which clarified the role of
Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) under the new procedure but left the original
holdings intact.
38
The court's decision inAl-Shabazz sought to clarify the confusion over the
PCR process in two ways. First, the court interpreted the PCR statute not to
apply to claims raised by inmates, such as the loss of good-time credits and
prison conditions, considered noncollateral matters.39 Second, the court
mandated that such noncollateral claims should be adjudicated under current
Departmentprocedures ° and are entitled to judicial review as contested cases4'
under the South Carolina Administrative Procedures Act (APA).42
A noncollateral claim is any grievance by an inmate that does not
"challenge... the validity of [a] ... conviction or sentence."43 The court
specifically held that claims "regarding sentence-related credits or other
condition of imprisonment... [do] not affect the validity of the underlying
30. The Department's policy is to provide "substitute counsel" to represent inmates at a
correctional hearing. Id. at 751. See South Carolina Department of Corrections Manual for
Operations, Inmate Disciplinary System, No. OP-22.14.
31. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 746.
32. Id. at 746.
33. 277 S.C. 525, 526, 290 S.E.2d 414,415 (1982) (holding that PCR is appropriate only
when claiming "to have a sentence vacated, set aside or corrected" and not appropriate to
challenge the loss of good-time credits and prison conditions).
34. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 746.
35. Id. at 758.
36. Id. at 745.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 752-58.
39. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 750. The court noted that "PCR is a proper avenue of relief
only when the applicant mounts a collateral attack challenging the validity of his conviction or
sentence .... ." Id. (emphasis added). There are two noncollateral exceptions to the court's
holding. These two exceptions are expressly provided for in section 17-27-20(a)(5) of the PCR
statute: "Any person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims: ...
That his sentence has expired, his probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked,
or he is otherwise unlawfully held in custody or other restraint... ." § 17-27-20(a)(5).
40. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 752.
41. A "'contested case' means a proceeding ... in which the legal rights, duties, or
privileges of a party are required by law to be determined by an agency after an opportunity for
hearing." S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-310(3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1999).
42. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 750; see S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-310 to -400 (Law. Co-
op.1 986 & Supp. 1998).
43. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 749.
2000
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conviction or sentence."' Hence, such claims are noncollateral matters and
consequently impermissible in a PCR application.45 To support its finding, the
court directed its attention to the newly-enacted statute of limitations for PCR
applications. 46 The one year limitation applies even to "newly discovered
material facts that require vacation of a conviction or sentence."47 The
argument follows that because credit-related and prison-condition claims can
presumably arise well beyond the one-year statutory window, the legislature,
like the court, must have regarded these claims as inappropriate in a PCR
application.48
The court's inclination to bar such claims was not entirely new. In Tutt v.
State noncollateral matters, specifically loss of good-time credits and
conditions of imprisonment, had already been rejected by the court as
inappropriate for a PCR proceeding.49 The court in Tutt affirmed the lower
court's decision to deny an inmate a post-conviction relief hearing for claims
related to prison conditions and loss of good-time credits.5" The court held that
the PCR Act may be "invoked only by someone who is claiming the right to
have a sentence vacated, set aside or corrected."
5'
While Tutt was the obvious precursor to the decision in Al-Shabazz, Tutt
was less expansive thanAl-Shabazz in three respects. Tutt contained no explicit
prohibition of all noncollateral matters. Additionally, Tutt's holding does not
clearly address loss of good-time credits. Finally, and most notably, the Tutt
decision provided no alternative by which inmates might pursue these
noncollateral matters. Consequently, the courts continued to permit such claims
in PCR proceedings because PCR provided "an established and uniform
process, as well as the availability of appointed counsel.""2 Therefore, Al-
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-45(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
47. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at748-749.
48. See Id. However, there is no indication that the General Assembly intended such an
adverse effect on noncollateral claims.
49. 277 S.C. 525, 526, 290 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1982). The actual holding of Tuft may not
include loss of good-time credits. While Tutt sought the "restoration of good-time lost" in his
PCR application, it is unclear whether the dismissal of that particular claim was actually an issue
on appeal. Id. The supreme court stated that the court below had dismissed the allegations
because the court lacked "jurisdiction to consider questions pertaining to prison living
conditions." Id. (emphasis added). This statement appears to be the specific decision that the
supreme court affirmed. The case does not explain the disposition of the other claims including
the restoration of good-time credits. Most likely, the calculation of good-time credits determined
the status of Tutt's living conditions. Ultimately, the court's holding, that the PCR statute may
be "invoked only by someone who is claiming the right to have a sentence vacated, set aside or
corrected," appears broad enough so as to exclude good-time credit claims as well. Id. Thus the
holding also appears to prohibit credit-related claims. Id. Regardless, Al-Shabazz resolves the
question affirmatively. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 749-50.
50. Tutt, 277 S.C. at 526, 290 S.E.2d at 415.
51. Id.
52. Al-Shabazz,527 S.E.2d at 748.
Vol. 51: 839
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Shabazz was a necessary clarification and expansion of the court's stance on
noncollateral issues.
However, Al-Shabazz is most notable not for its clarification of ambiguous
case precedent but rather for its attempt to provide what it had omitted in Tutt:
an alternative mechanism to deal with noncollateral matters. If prison
conditions and loss of good-time credits could not be challenged within the
court system through PCR, then conceivably inmates might not be assured
judicial review of such matters at all. Thus the court held that, after a
disciplinary hearing, an inmate "may seek [judicial] review of [a] ... final
decision," under the provisions for the contested cases contained in the APA.53
This holding was a striking departure from the court's own precedent54 and
went to an extent further than any other state in the country.55 The APA would
only be applicable to such noncollateral claims that require procedural due
process.56 Al-Shabazz expressly recognized prison conditions and credits-
related issues as noncollateral matters which affected liberty interests, thus
53. Id. at 750.
54. Until AI-Shabazz the court had never required the use of the APA in Department
disciplinary hearings. Having not definitely answered the question in Tuft, the court has since
had a number of opportunities to consider the use of the APA and has consistently declined to
do so. See Busby v. Moore, 330 S.C. 201,498 S.E.2d 883 (1998); Simmons v. State, 316 S.C.
28, 446 S.E.2d 436 (1994); Harris v. State, 309 S.C. 466, 424 S.E.2d 509 (1992); Elmore v.
State, 305 S.C. 456, 409 S.E.2d 397 (1991). Two years prior to Tutt, the court inPruitt v. State
suggested that the APA might operate as an alternative to the PCR Act. 274 S.C. 565, 567 n. 2,
266 S.E.2d 779, 780 n.2 (1980). While the question was not ripe, the court did note that the
inmate had not sought judicial review under § 1-23-380 of the then recently enacted APA. Id.
Although not presented squarely with the issue, the court went on to recognize that at least one
state, Washington, had decided that prison disciplinary procedures were exempt from judicial
review under the state's APA. Id. (citing Dawson v. Hearing Committee, 597 P.2d 1353, 1357
(Wash. 1979)). Since that time, the courts have continued to review these protected liberty
interests in noncollateral matters through discretionary PCR proceedings. See Simmons v. State,
316 S.C. 28, 29, 446 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1994). Thus, an APA-type proceeding followed by
automatic judicial review is clearly a departure from the historical procedure and case law of this
state.
55. Iowa, Rhode Island, Washington, Arizona, and Oklahoma declined to apply the APA
because the state's APA either expressly exempted prison disciplinary hearings or because the
APA was generally not designed for such proceedings. See Rose v. Arizona Dep't. of
Corrections, 804 P.2d 845, 848-9 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (finding that APA does not apply to
prison disciplinary proceedings); Wycoffv. Iowa Dist. Court, 580 N.W.2d 786,788 (Iowa 1998)
(permitting judicial review of prison disciplinary proceeding under PCR but not APA); Walen
v. Department of Corrections, 505 N.W.2d 519, 521-22 (Mich. 1993); Canady v. Reynolds, 880
P.2d 391,399 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (finding that APA specifically exempted review ofprison
system determinations); L'Heureux v. State Dep'tof Corrections, 708 A.2d 549,553 (R.I. 1998)
(finding that APA was not designed to apply to disciplinary proceedings); Dawson v. Hearing
Committee, 597 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Wash. 1979) (finding thatprison disciplinary proceedings lie
outside the scope and intent of APA). Alternatively, Michigan has applied a portion of its APA
provisions to its prison system.
56. Procedural due process is necessary to protect the deprivation of liberty and property
interests. See Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
2000
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requiring administrative due process under the APA and subsequent judicial
review.
57
The court, in some detail, outlined how inmates might pursue judicial
review under the new procedure. 8 Inmates will remain subject to the
disciplinary procedures as prescribed by the Department. 9 The court found that
the Department's disciplinary procedures fully complied with the due process
requirements set forth by the United States Supreme Courto for "major"
disciplinary proceedings."' A-Shabazz changes the process after the inmate has
been subject to the prison disciplinary hearing. Instead of initiating a civil
action against the state through a PCR application, the inmate will now seek
review of the "contested case"62 under the APA.63 Administrative Law Judges
(ALJs) will preside over these appeals." The ALJs will be restricted to an
appellate-capacity review of the Department's determination.65 Consequently,
ALJs will not make independent findings of fact or law." Once the ALJ makes
a final determination, the inmate may, within thirty days of that decision, file
a petition in circuit court for judicial review of the ALJ's findings. 67 Despite the
court's continued advocacy of the "hands off' doctrine," inmates will have a
guaranteed right of review. 9 The circuit court judge may "not substitute [his
or her] judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence., 70 The
ALJ's decision will only be reversed if it is "clearly erroneous in view of...
57. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 750; see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,560-561
(1974) (stating that a statutory right to sentence-related credits is of "considerable importance"
andmaybe a conditionally protected liberty interest); Domegan v. Fair, 859 F.2d 1059,1064 (1st
Cir.1988) (holding that there is a liberty interest in statutorily required prison conditions).
58. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 751-758.
59. Id. at 751; see SOUTH CAROLINA DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, MANUAL FOR OPERATIONS,
INMATE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM.
60. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 751-52 (citing Wolff, 481 U.S. at 563-72).
61. Major disciplinary proceedings carry penalties that threaten a protected liberty interest.
See Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 752 n.8. Consequently, violations that threaten the loss of
sentence-related credits require a major disciplinary hearing. Id. Appropriately, major
disciplinary hearings involve more serious rule violations including "sexual assault upon another
inmate, robbery by force, and rioting." Pruitt v. State, 274 S.C. 565, 566, 266 S.E.2d 779, 781
(1980).
62. See supra note 42.
63. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 750.
64. Id. at 754.
65. Id. (citing Reliance Ins. Co. v. Smith, 327 S.C. 528,534,489 S.E.2d 674, 677 (Ct. App.
1997).
66. Reliance, 327 S.C. at 534,489 S.E.2d at 677.
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(A)(1) (West Supp. 1999).
68. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 757; see also Brown v. Evatt, 322 S.C. 189,194,470 S.E.2d
848, 851 (1996) (finding that an inmate has no protected liberty interest where downgrade in
prison condition remains within the limits of the sentence imposed); Crowe v. Leeke, 273 S.C.
763, 764,259 S.E.2d 614, 615 (1979) (holding judicial review not available for transfers within
prison system or downgrading custody).
69. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-610(B) (West Supp. 1999); Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (West Supp. 1999).
Vol. 51: 839
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substantial evidence ... arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of
discretion. .. ."" ,,
III. ANALYsis
The court admitted that the APA was not designed with the "prison
disciplinary system in mind."72 In fact, the court declined to apply all of the
APA's provisions to the Department's internal procedures. 73 Nevertheless, the
court still found that the Department qualified as an agency for purposes of the
APA.74 This holding, while logically consistent, was hardly necessary.
Invoking the APA was premature because the court's initial construction of the
PCR Act, barringnoncollateral claims from PCRproceedings, was wrong. This
Note argues that under the PCR Act an inmate might bring credit-related and
prison condition claims. 5
It seems clear, however, that the opportunity to bring these claims under
the PCR Act is not worth advocating if the Act is not, in some significant way,
superior to the APA. If the APA provides substantially the same or better due
process than the PCR Act, then the Court's decision is good for inmates
whether it is necessarily the right interpretation of the PCR Act or not. If,
however, the APA, on balance, is less beneficial to inmates than the PCR Act,
then a reconsideration of the PCR Act's correct interpretation is crucial to
securing an inmate's statutory rights under the Act.
The following sections explore these concerns. Part A details why the
court's interpretation of the PCR Act was misguided, while Part B
demonstrates how relief under the Act is superior to the Al-Shabazz court's
APA procedure.
A. Interpretation of the PCR Act: ChiefJustice Finney was Correct
This Note has already identified the court's historical discomfort,
beginning in Tutt v. State,76 with any interpretation of the PCR Act which might
accommodate noncollateral claims. Ultimately, the court chose to preclude
such an interpretation altogether.77 However, both the statutory language and
71. Id. § 1-23-380(A)(6)(e), (f).
72. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 752-53.
73. Id at 753. The following APA provisions are not applicable to the "internal prison
disciplinary process:" S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-23-320, -330, -340, -360 (provisions regarding
notice and hearing, evidentiary matters, and communication by the agency assigned to the case).
74. Al-Shabazz,527 S.E.2d at 754.
75. Section 17-27-20(a)(5) reads in relevant part: "Any person who has been convicted
of, or sentenced for, a crime and who claims: ... (5) That his sentence has expired, his
probation, parole or conditional release unlawfully revoked, or he is otherwise unlawfully held
in custody or other restraint ......
76. 277 S.C. 525, 290 S.E.2d 414 (1982).
77. AI-Shabazz,527 S.E.2d at 749.
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the statutory purpose of the PCR Act suggest that the majority's interpretation
may be misguided.
First, the express language of the PCR Act suggests that there is room for
the inclusion of noncollateral matters. One reading of section 17-27-20(a)(5)
seems to include good-time credits and prison conditions as cognizable claims.
The section reads in relevant part: "Any person who has been convicted of, or
sentenced for, a crime and who claims... he is otherwise unlawfully held in
custody or other restraint."' While the Department holds a convicted inmate
lawfully, an inmate who has been unjustly stripped of his or her good-time
credits arguably is being "unlawfully held."79 Chief Justice Finney subscribed
to this reading of the Act but concurred out of concern forjudicial harmony and
finality.8" Likewise, Rhode Island's Supreme Court also agreed with this
interpretation of its PCR Act."' Rhode Island adopted materially the same
version of the uniform PCR Act. 2 In Leonardo v. Vose83 the Rhode Island
Supreme Court held that PCR applications were the appropriate remedy for
challenging the computation of earned good-time credits.8 In Leonardo the
inmate sought a determination of his claim under Rhode Island's
Administrative Procedures Act.8 The trial judge concluded that the inmate had
incorrectly brought his claim under the state APA and should have made a PCR
application instead.86 The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the trial
judge's determination, necessarily holding that the language of the PCR Act
included these noncollateral claims.87
This reading is also supported by the statutory intent of the PCR Act. The
very purpose of state PCR statutes demands the recognition of good-time credit
and prison-condition claims. The United States Supreme Court has stated that
the states must provide inmates, in lieu of habeas corpus, some method by
which to raise claims alleging violations of federal rights.88 Accordingly, the
78. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-20(a)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
79. Id.
80. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 758 (Finney, J., concurring).
81. Leonardo v. Vose, 671 A.2d 1232 (R.I. 1996)
82. UNIFORM POST-CONVICTIONPROCEDUREACr, I 1AU.L.A. 11 (Supp. 1999) adoptedin
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-1 (a)(5) (1997). The Rhode Island statute is identical to S.C. CODE § 17-
27-20(a)(5) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999).
83. 671 A.2d 1232 (R.I. 1996).
84. Id. at 1233. However, the judge ultimately dismissed the inmate's PCR application
because the inmate's original conviction was still on appeal. Id. In accordance with South
Carolina, the judge held that PCR is only appropriate once a conviction is final. Id.
85. R.I. GEN. LAws § 42-35-15 (1956).
86. Leonardo, 671 A.2d at 1233.
87. Id.
88. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 238-39 (1949) (declaring that the States must afford
inmates some "clearly defined method by which they may raise claims of denial of federal
rights"). The Court in Case v. Nebraska suggested that the absence of a state post-conviction
remedy may, in and of itself, be a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 381 U.S. 336, 337,
344 (1965) (Clark, J., concurring & Brennan, J., concurring); see also Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103, 113 (1935).
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South Carolina General Assembly, in 1969, adopted its version of the 1966
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure (PCP) Act.?9 Legislative history offers
little insight as to the General Assembly's motives.90 However, the South
Carolina Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the General Assembly's
adoption of a PCR statute as affirmative compliance with the United States
Supreme Court's mandate.9 In Finklea v. State92 the South Carolina Supreme
Court, adopting the comments of the Uniform PCP Act,9' stated that the aim of
the PCR Act was "to bring together and consolidate into one simple statute all
the remedies... which are at present available for challenging the validity of
a sentence of imprisonment."'94 The court plainly stated that South Carolina's
PCR Act was created to encompass all relief available under federal habeas
corpus.95 The General Assembly's adoption of a PCR Act and the South
Carolina Supreme Court's subsequent interpretation of that action demonstrates
that South Carolina's General Assembly intended the PCR Act to be a habeas-
like substitute, crafted in compliance with the United States Supreme Court's
directive to the states.
If the General Assembly intended the state's PCR Act to be a habeas-like
substitute, then those claims cognizable under the writ of habeas corpus should
be cognizable under the PCR Act. Arguably, the PCR Act should afford an
even broader remedy than habeas corpus. If the Act's intent is to consolidate
all post-conviction remedies into one simple statute,96 then remedies provided
by the writ of habeas corpus should constitute only a portion of the PCR Act's
spectra of remedy. At the very least, the PCR Act should provide comparable
relief.
Accordingly, the traditional use of habeas corpus to pursue certain
noncollateral claims is strong evidence that those same claims should be
cognizable under the state PCR Act. Historically, habeas corpus facilitated a
broad range of claims which affect the "fact, length, or ... conditions of
confinement."'97 In Withrow v. Williams98 Justice Scalia noted that habeas
89. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-10 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &West Supp. 1999).
90. See Cowden, supra note 19, at 422 n. 13 ("A search .... revealed only that the bill was
originally introduced... April 2, 1969 .... The bill was enrolled for ratification on April 23,
and was ratified on April 29, 1969. No committe reports or staff memoranda were included in
the file at the Archives.").
91. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 746; see also Simpson v. State, 329 S.C. 43, 46, 495 S.E.2d
429,430-31 (1998) (outlining the history of habeas corpus and the advent of the PCR Act).
92. 273 S.C. 157, 255 S.E.2d 447 (1979).
93. Finklea, 273 S.C. at 158, 255 S.E.2d at 447; see UNIFORM POST-CONVICTION
PROCEDURE Acr § 1, 11 U.L.A. 486 (1966).
94. Finklea, 273 S.C. at 158, 255 S.E.2d at 447-48"(first emphasis added); see Cowden,
supra note 19, at 422.
95. Finklea, 273 S.C. at 158, 255 S.E.2d at 447-48.
96. Id.
97. 1 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CoRPus PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 9.1, 386 & n.30 (3d ed. 1998).
98. 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
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corpus "jurisdiction... is... sweeping in its breadth."" More specifically,
federal courts have consistently permitted, and even required, inmates to use
habeas corpus to raise claims relating to the duration of a sentence, including
good-time credits'" and prison conditions.'"' Any valid claim that "would
advance the date of... eligibility for release from present incarceration...
implicates the core purpose of habeas review."' ' Since good-time credit and
prison-condition claims were appropriate under habeas corpus, a statutory
scheme, intended as a comparable substitute for the writ, would logically
contemplate the same claims. For the PCR Act to be what the Supreme Court
required and what the General Assembly intended (namely a substitute remedy
for the Federal writ of habeas corpus) the state's PCR Act should be read to
include claims regarding good-time credits and prison conditions.
However, the General Assembly's decision to place a one-year statute of
limitations on applications for PCR 3 makes the interpretive issue a seemingly
moot point. Presuming that claims regarding prison conditions or loss of good-
time credits will arise well beyond a year after the conviction, the statute of
limitations almost completely bars such claims, even in the absence of the
court's determination in Al-Shabazz. This is a disturbing result for several
reasons. First, the result undermines South Carolina's expectation that the Act
would "comprehend[] and take[] the place of all other common law, statutory,
or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the
conviction or sentence. It shall be used exclusively in place of them."'"
Second, this limitation raises the question as to whether South Carolina's PCR
Act continues to meet the United States Supreme Court's mandate in Case. °5
Not squarely presented with such an issue in Case,'6 the Supreme Court has
99. Id. at 715 (Scalia, J. concurring).
100. LIEBMAN, supra note 97, § 9.1,386-387 & n.33; see id at 388 n.33, 390 (citing Preiser
v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) ("when a state prisoner is challenging the... duration
of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to...
[a] speedierrelease from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ ofhabeas corpus.");
Bostic v. Carlson, 884 F.2d 1267, 1269 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that habeas corpus relief is
available upon proof that state denied prisoner good-time credits); see also Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477, 483, 487 (1994) (holding that habeas corpus is the only appropriate remedy to
"call into question the lawfulness of... confinement"). Heck has been interpreted to make
habeas corpus not merely the appropriate but the exclusive remedy for challenging the
administration of good-time credits. LIEBMAN, supra note 97, § 9.1, 391 n.33.
101. LIEBMAN, supra note 97, § 9.1,386-393 & n.33, 34.
102. Id. at 387 n.33 (quoting Garlotte v. Fordice, 515 U.S. 39, 47 (1995)).
103. S.C. CODEANN. § 17-27-45(A) (West Supp. 1999). A PCR application "must be filed
within one year after the sending of the remittitur to the lower court from an appeal or the filing
of the final decision upon an appeal, whichever is later." Id.
104. S.C. CODEANN. § 17-27-20(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999). However, this
statutory language has not been interpreted as strong as it seems. See Harvey v. South Carolina,
310 F. Supp. 83 (D.S.C. 1970) (holding that the PCR Act was not the only remedy to a state
prisoner and its existence did not preclude habeas corpus as a remedy).
105. 381 U.S. 336 (1965).
106. Id. at 336-37.
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yet to determine how complete the state PCR method must be as compared to
the relief provided by habeas corpus.
Taken together, the plain language of the statute, the nature of habeas
corpus, the demands of the Supreme Court, the actions of the General
Assembly, and the language of South Carolina's courts overwhelmingly point
to an interpretation contrary to the decision in Al-Shabazz. Ultimately,
however, it is incumbent upon the General Assembly to decide whether they
intended the statute of limitations to have the effect of excluding these
noncollateral matters and whether such an exclusion remains in line with the
purpose of the PCR Act. The General Assembly and the court, for the
foregoing reasons, should find that the AI-Shabazz decision does not serve the
purposes of the PCR Act.
B. The Administrative Procedure Act v. The Post-Conviction ReliefAct
Nevertheless, inmates will no longer be able to pursue their claims
regarding loss of good-time credit and prison-conditions through the PCR
mechanism."°7 The question remains whether inmates will fair better or worse
under the APA.
The primary advantage of the APA over the PCR Act is the APA's
automatic right of review.' Although this right is not absolute, the United
States Constitution entitles prisoners to adequate, effective, and meaningful
access to the courts.°'9 The court inAl-Shabazz, while lauding the Department's
"expert" maintenance of the state prison system, tactfully recognized that the
Department's disciplinary proceedings are not flawless."' The court recognized
"that errors and omissions, whether caused by bureaucratic oversight, a
misunderstanding of the law, or an intentional act, are likely to occur in a
system that closely controls the lives of some 21,500 inmates on any given
day."' This admission validates inmates' presumed concerns, that their
"keepers" are acting as judge, jury, and prosecuting attorney. Judicial review
operates as a necessary check on the Department's authority.
The PCRAct also provides judicial review of Department proceedings but
on a discretionary basis." 2 Obviously, a court's dismissal ofa PCR application
cannot be made arbitrarily or in the absence of proper procedure," 3 but a denial
107. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 741.
108. S.C. CODEANN. § 1-23-380(A) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998); seeAl-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d
at 752; Eldon D. Wedlock, Jr., AI-Shabazz and the APA, 11 S.C. LAW. 42,44 (1999).
109. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977).
110. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 757.
111. Id.
112. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(b)-(c) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999).
113. See, e.g., Delaney v. State, 269 S.C. 555, 238 S.E.2d 679 (1977) (holding that the
denial of PCR application was inappropriate without an evidentiary hearing upon the issues
raised by the inmate); Coardes v. State, 262 S.C. 493, 493, 206 S.E.2d 264, 266 (1974)
(affirming a dismissal of a PCR application when there was no material allegation of fact).
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ofa PCR application remains more discretionary than the right of review under
the APA. "4 Ironically, this discretion is evidenced best by the courts' treatment
of these noncollateral claims. In Simmons v. State"5 the South Carolina
Supreme Court admitted that conditions of imprisonment have been considered
on a discretionary basis in PCR proceedings." 6 Additionally, judges may
dismiss applications at any time when they feel that "no purpose would be
served by any further proceedings.""..7
Ultimately, however, PCR proceedings involve two, superior procedural
advantages over the APA right ofjudicial review. First, the APA's guaranteed
right of review loses some vitality in light of its lower standard of review."'
While AI-Shabazz resolved the role of the AL's in this new process, 119 the
decision does not appear to improve the inmates' dilemma. Upon final
disposition by the Department regarding a prison-condition down-grade or a
loss of good-time credits, the inmate may appeal to an ALP" The ALJ reviews
the Department's determination in an "appellate capacity.'' Likewise, the
114. S.C. CODEANN. § 17-27-70(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999). On the other
hand, appeals of ALl determinations are "by right." Id. § 1-23-610(B).
115. 316 S.C. 28,446 S.E.2d 436 (1994)
116. Id. at437.
117. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-70(b) (Law. Co-op. 1976 & West Supp. 1999).
118. S.C. CODEANN. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998) establishes the following
standard of review for the court in evaluating the Department's decision:
The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact. The court may affirm the
decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The
court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) affected by other error of law;
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion.
119. Al-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 754.
120. Id.
121. Id.; see Reliance Ins. Co. v. Smith, 327 S.C. 528,534,489 S.E.2d 674,677 (Ct. App.
1997) (stating that the ALT is restricted to an appellate capacity). However, the court in Al-
Shabazz did not specify the appellate standard of review. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 754. In fact
the court could not identify an APA provision that required AL's to assume an appellate role
and instead relied on case law. Id. at *9. However, the court in Al-Shabazz appears to
misinterpret the holding of Reliance. The court suggests that Reliance stands for the "converse
proposition that an ALJ is restricted to reviewing the decision below when acting in an appellate
capacity." Id. Yet the court of appeals in Reliance expressly states that a proceeding "before the
AL is in the nature of a de novo hearing." Reliance, 327 S.C. at 534, 489 S.E.2d at 677. Thus,
contrary to the decision inAl-Shabazz, the AL appears unrestricted by the findings of the court
below. See id. The court should revisit this determination inAl-Shabazz and clarify the authority
for its finding. Inmates and practitioners need to know whether the ALT will review the contested
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circuit court judge, upon judicial review of the AL's determination, is not
allowed to "substitute its judgment... as to the weight of the evidence."'" The
court may reverse the AL's determination only if it is "clearly erroneous in
view of... substantial evidence... arbitrary... capricious or characterized
by abuse of discretion.'"
Thus the court's decision forces the ALJ to review the Department's
determination under some appellate standard of review, 24 and then the circuit
court judge likewise reviews the AL's determination under an appellate
standard ofreview.'" It is appellate review of an appellate review. This process
appears different even from the state court system of review where the highest
appellate court generally sits in the same position as the intermediate appellate
courts. In this case, the circuit court does not review the Department's decision
for error, but rather the circuit court reviews the AL's decision for error.'26
Thus the circuit court's review ultimately proves increasingly attenuated from
any meaningful adjudication of the inmate's original complaint. Accordingly,
the inmate bears a heavy and confusing burden when seeking reversal of an
unfavorable Department decision.
A PCR proceeding, on the other hand, is not really a review at all, but
rather an original action.' 27 The judge considers all evidence and testimony de
novo. '2 The court then makes both specific findings of fact and conclusions of
law.29 Thus the court is virtually unrestricted by the determinations of the
Department. If the inmate is disappointed with the Department's determination,
the inmate may make the challenge anew, without prejudice, before the circuit
court judge in a PCR proceeding.
30
case de novo or under some other appellate standard of review.
122. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1998).
123. Id. The court stated:
Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that, considering the
record as a whole, a reasonable mind would accept to support an
administrative agency's action. Substantial evidence exists
when, if the case were presented to a jury, the court would
refuse to direct a verdict because the evidence raises questions
of fact for the jury. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence,
but is something less than the weight of the evidence.
Al-Shabazz,527 S.E.2d at 756.
124. See supra note 121.
125. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
126. Id.
127. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. At first blush, the PCR Act might appear to give the inmate "two bites at the apple."
If the inmate is satisfied with the Department's determination, then the inmate will let the
decision stand. If the inmate is dissatisfied, then the inmate can essentially "retry" the entire
issue. However, considering that the Department's administrative proceeding requires
significantly less due process protections than the PCR proceeding, these are not two equal
"bites." Under the PCR Act "[a]ll rules and statutes applicable in civil proceedings are available
to the parties. The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony or other
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The second advantage of the PCR Act is that an indigent applicant who is
granted a hearing is entitled to court-appointed counsel.' This entitlement is
significant in two respects. Under the APA the inmate is prejudiced by the
development of an initial record without the assistance of trained counsel.'
During the Department's proceeding the inmate only has a right to a "counsel
substitute, anon-attorney designated to assist the inmate or represent him at the
hearing."'3 It is crucial to develop an accurate and fair record in the
Department and ALJ proceedings because under the APA the circuit court
judge has little discretion to reverse the ALJ and Department determinations,
and the judge makes no independent factual findings at all."3 Thus crucial
mistakes by non-attorney counsel in the Department proceedings or before an
ALJ may create a record that might irreversibly damage an inmate's judicial
review under the APA. In contrast, errors made on the part of non-attorney
counsel are of no detriment in a PCR proceeding before the department,
because issues of fact are wholly reconsidered before the judge.
Additionally, the APA does not entitle an inmate to court-appointed
counsel upon judicial review of the Department's determination.' 3- Thus, even
upon judicial review of the Department's findings, the inmate will continue to
be unrepresented by an attorney.
In short, by embracing review under the APA the court has adopted a
procedure through which unaided inmates will assuredly fumble. Inmates
cannot consistently fare better under the APA than under the PCR Act when
they are prejudiced by an inadequately developed record, handicapped by the
absence of court-appointed counsel, and restricted to the lowest standard of
review for error.
IV. CONCLUSION
evidence and may order the applicant brought before it for hearing." Id. Alternatively, the
disciplinary hearings do not include a right to appointed counsel or an absolute right to confront
witnesses. SOUTH CAROLINADEPARTMENTOF CORREcTIONS, MANUALFOROPERATIONS, INMATE
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM, No. OP-22.14. Additionally, where the APA would otherwise require an
agency to allow depositions, subpoenas, and other evidentiary tools, the court has declined to
make these APA provisions applicable to the Department. AI-Shabazz, 527 S.E.2d at 752-53.
Thus, the PCR proceeding is arguably the first true and complete adjudication of the complaint
on the merits.
131. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-27-60 (Law. Co-op. 1976); Whitehead v. State, 310 S.C.
532, 534,426 S.E.2d 315, 316 (1992); S.C.R. Civ. P. 71. 1(d). See generally Cowden supra note
19 (tracing the effects of this provision and suggesting improvements).
132. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-23-310 to -400 (West Supp. 1999).
133. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECIONS, MANUAL FOR OPERATIONS, INMATE
DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM, No. OP-22.14. Ironically the Department appears to go beyond what the
United States Supreme Court requires in a prison disciplinary hearing. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 570
(stating that an inmate is only entitled to a prison employee or a fellow inmate). Presumably
"non-attorney" counsel might include someone other than a prison employee or a fellow inmate.
134. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-380(A)(6) (West Supp. 1999).
135. See id. §§ 1-23-380 to -390.
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The Court's decision in Al-Shabazz bars inmates from a meaningful use
of the PCR Act when certain protected liberty interests are at stake. While the
PCR process is clear, efficient, and understood, use of the APA will subject
inmates to an experiment in post-conviction remedy. The PCR Act provides a
procedurally more beneficial mechanism for inmates to pursue certain
noncollateral claims. Thus, the South Carolina Supreme Court should not have
abandoned an understood process that by its very nature comprehended all
available post-conviction remedies. Now inmates, attorneys, and judges must
explore and familiarize themselves with the application of two distinct
processes to resolve what amounts to the same claim: a protected liberty
interest. Accordingly, the General Assembly must examine whether they
intended to bar noncollateral claims that legitimately arise well beyond the
statute of limitations. The South Carolina Supreme Court should then revisitAl-
Shabazz and find, consistent with both the language and the express purpose
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